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This article outlines and critically examines the relationship between the qualifying
declarations and the economic advantages of the Cape Town Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment. It shows that the qualifying declarations
operate rather differently from how they are perceived in academic literature and prac-
tice. Specifically, the article shows that the critical advantage of the Convention and the
qualifying declaration is the potential to reduce enforcement risk relating to different
States in a specific transactional setting and not, as some observers might wrongly
perceive, from the Cape Town Discount. Thus, if States are not prepared to make the
qualifying declarations, this should not deter them from ratifying the Convention and
the Protocol. States and society may benefit from adoption of the Convention and its
related protocols with partial—or even without—adoption of the qualifying declar-
ations, bearing in mind of course the interdependency of the Convention’s remedies.
I. Introduction
Academics and practitioners have often urged that Contracting States will
not receive the Cape Town Convention’s economic benefits unless they (i) prop-
erly implement the Convention into national law and (ii) make the declarations
collectively known as the ‘qualifying declarations’ under the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Aircraft Sector
Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (ASU). The qualifying
declarations, as expressed in the current version of the ASU,1 are primarily
those declarations relating to the exercise of non-judicial remedies,2 advance
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2 Application of extra-judicial remedies pursuant to Article 54(2) of the Convention.
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relief,3 the availability of the lease remedy,4 irrevocable de-registration, and expert
authorization (IDERA),5 and remedies on insolvency and insolvency assistance
procedures.6 Among the various economic benefits associated with them, perhaps
the most cited example is the Cape Town Discount.7 Under the ASU, the Cape
Town Discount is a reduction of 10 percent of the minimum premium rate
granted by governmental export credit agencies to aircraft operators. Thus, it
has been understandably argued that the qualifying declarations are a reliable
indicator for a successful implementation of the Convention into national law
and that they play an important role—if not the most significant role—in guar-
anteeing the advantages of the Convention.8 Some of them go even further and
3 Application of Relief Pending Final Determination under Article 13 of the Convention and its
modifications introduced by Article X of the Aircraft Protocol (including the suggested time limits
Article X (2) of the Aircraft Protocol).
4 Application of the remedy that a chargee can grant a lease of the object in that territory pursuant to
Article 54(1) of the Convention.
5 Application of the De-registration and export request authorisation under Article XIII of the
Aircraft Protocol.
6 Application of Alternative A under Article XI of the Aircraft Protocol to all types of insolvency
proceeding and that the waiting period for the purposes of Article XI (3) of that Alternative shall be
no more than 60 calendar days.
7 Ludwig Weber, ‘Public and private features of the Cape Town Convention’ (2015) 4 Cape Town
Convention Journal 53, 54; Kristin van Zwieten, ‘The insolvency provisions of the Cape Town
Convention and Protocols: historical and economic perspectives’ (2012) 2 Cape Town
Convention Journal 53, 72 ; Roy Goode, ‘Private Commercial Law Conventions and Public and
Private International Law: The radical approach of the Cape Town Convention 2001 and its
Protocols’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 526–7; Yoshinobu Zasu and
Ikumi Sato, ‘Providing credibility around the world: effective devices of the Cape Town
Convention’ (2012) 33 European Journal of Law and Economics 577, 587; Marisa Chan, ‘New
OECD Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft’ (2007) 1 Law & Financial
Markets Review 511, 512; Jeffrey Wool, ‘Treaty Design, Implementation, and Compliance
Benchmarking Economic Benefit: A Framework as Applied to the Cape Town Convention’
(2012) 17 Uniform Law Review 633, 645; Jeffrey Wool, ‘Compliance with Transnational
Commercial Law Treaties: A Framework as Applied to the Cape Town Convention’ (2014) 3
Cape Town Convention Journal 5, 21; Brian F Havel and John Q Mulligan, ‘The Cape Town
Convention and The Risk of Renationalization: A Comment in Reply to Jeffrey Wool and Andrej
Jonovic’ (2014) 3 Cape Town Convention Journal 81, 91.
8 Aviation Working Group, ‘Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment and its Aircraft Protocol – Summary of National Implementation’ (December
2016) <http://www.awg.aero/assets/docs/CTC-IP-Summary-Chart-(Full%20Version)-(13).
pdf> accessed 6 April 2019: ‘By effective implementation, AWG means that: (i) a strong, com-
mercially oriented set of declarations were made by a country when ratifying or acceding to the
Treaty, and (ii) the Treaty has force of law, and to the extent of any conflict, prevails over other law,
in that country. As an objective proxy for whether such declarations were made, we summarise
whether a country made the Qualifying Declarations, as set out in the OECD Sector
Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (2011)’; Wool, ‘Treaty Design,
Implementation, and Compliance Benchmarking Economic Benefit: A Framework as Applied
to the Cape Town Convention’, (n 7) 645: ‘The rule is prescriptive and binary: the discount is
available if, and only if, the qualifying declarations are made. The same underlying reasoning
applies to all other forms of EB. Contracting States seeking EB must make the qualifying declar-
ations’; Teresa Rodrı´guez de las Heras Ballell, ‘The Accession by Spain to the Cape Town
Convention: A First Assessment’ (2014) 19 Uniform Law Review 1, 9: ‘At the time of ratification
of the Protocol, the set of declarations to be made should be carefully selected in order to exploit to
the full the benefits of implementing the Cape Town system—pondering OECD ‘qualifying declar-
ations’—and to prevent internal contradictions between the CTC and its Protocols’. Teresa
Rodrı´guez de las Heras Ballell, ‘Key Points for the Effective Implementation of the Cape Town
Convention: The Accession of Spain to the Aircraft Protocol’ (2016) 21 Uniform Law Review 279,
282: ‘First, the careful selection of declarations to be made by a contracting State is critical for two
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see the qualifying declarations as a conditio sine qua non for the receipt of the
Convention’s economic benefits.9
This article seeks to establish that the role and benefits of the qualifying dec-
larations have been overemphasized. Although significant benefits can be
achieved under the qualifying declarations, States and society will benefit from
the adoption of the Cape Town Convention and its related protocols despite not
making the qualifying declarations.10 Thus, if States are not prepared to make the
qualifying declarations, this should not deter them from ratifying the Convention
and the Protocol.
To illustrate this, the article proceeds as follows. Section II provides an analysis
of the concept and underlying purposes of declarations. It will thereby serve to
establish the foundation for an investigation and assessment of the usefulness of
the qualifying declarations as a tool to measure the successful implementation of
the Convention into national law. Based on the foregoing, Section III continues
with a more specific examination of the economic significance of the qualifying
declarations. The essential factors for the creation of the economic benefits under
the Convention and its related Protocols for Contracting States will be examined
in order to answer the crucial question of whether, and to what extent, the qual-
ifying declarations are really relevant for the generation of economic advantages.
This will show that there is a significant gap between the actual and the perceived
economic significance of the qualifying declarations in academic, legal, and pol-
itical discourse. In completing the analysis, Section IV takes stock of the overall
impact, potential, and limits of the qualifying declarations. It concludes with the
assessment that, although the qualifying declarations are of value and have or-
dinarily reached sound results, their economic significance is exaggerated and the
Contracting States benefit significantly from the Convention itself despite not
making the qualifying declarations.
reasons. On the one hand, in terms of economic benefits, certain declarations (qualifying declar-
ations) qualify a contracting Party for the CTC discount, in accordance with Annex 1 on the Sector
Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (ASU).’
9 Wool, ‘Treaty Design, Implementation, and Compliance Benchmarking Economic Benefit: A
Framework as Applied to the Cape Town Convention’, (n 7) 645.
10 Neil B Cohen, ‘Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier’ (1998) 33
Texas International Law Journal 173; Spiros Bazinas, ‘Modernising And Harmonising Secured
Credit Law: The Example of the UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, Part
1’ (2006) 21 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 20; Spiros Bazinas, ‘Modernising
And Harmonising Secured Credit Law: The Example of the UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on
Secured Transactions, Part 2’ (2006) 21 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 58;
Orkun Akseli, International Secured Transactions Law (Routledge), 67 et seqq; Louise Gullifer and
Orkun Akseli (eds), Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policies and Practice (Hart
Publishing 2016); John Armour and others, ‘How Do Creditor Rights Matter For Debt
Finance? A Review of Empirical Evidence’ in Frederique Dahan (ed), Research Handbook on
Secured Financing in Commercial Transactions (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015); Charles W
Mooney, ‘Choice-of-law rules for Secured Transactions: An Interest-Based and Modern
Principles-Based Framework for Assessment’ (2017) 22 Uniform Law Review 842; Marek
Dubovec and Giuliano G Castellano, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory Dimension of Secured
Transactions Law Reforms’ (2017) 22 Uniform Law Review 663.
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II. Concept of declarations in treaty law
1. Introduction
This section looks at the role played by declarations in the field of international
private law. It questions whether a traditional understanding of the concept of
declarations as a legal instrument for providing more flexibility for States and
achieving a wider ratification of international instruments is sustainable in the
context of the Convention and Protocol.11 This provides the basis for the exam-
ination of the legal and economic significance of the qualifying declarations.
Before turning to this issue, there is one important point to consider: that of
the crucial differentiation between reservations and declarations in international
law. The reason is that in the context of the Convention, declarations have to be
clearly distinguished from reservations since the Convention expressly authorizes
only the declarations listed in its Article 56 and those specified in Article XXXII of
its related Protocol. Reservations are not allowed in the context of the Convention
and, consequently, have no effect.12
2. Difference between reservations and declarations
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (https://treaties.un.
org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&
Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en) in Article 2(1)(d) defines reservations as ‘a unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to
that State.’ It follows that the decisive element of a reservation is its unilateral
nature, meaning that it does not have a binding effect on another Contracting
State unless specifically accepted by that Contracting State.13 This is also why it
offers the greatest possible flexibility to a reserving Contracting State with regard
11 Brian F Havel and Gabriel S Sanchez, The Principles and Practice of International Aviation Law
(Cambridge University Press 2014), 354 et seq: ‘The purported purpose was to be able to attract as
many countries as possible’; Mark J Sundahl, ‘The “Cape Town Approach”: A New Method of
Making International Law’ (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 339, footnote 46
stating that: ‘flexibility was built into the protocols in order to avoid the catastrophic result that
States might refuse to ratify a protocol that promoted commercial efficiency over more debt-
or-friendly public policies.’ Marco Torsello, ‘Reservations to international uniform commercial
law Conventions’ (2000) 5 Uniform Law Review 85, 119 stating with regard to Reservations:
‘Reservations, indeed, allow a degree of flexibility that renders the Conventions to which they
apply suitable for adoption by a larger number of States’; Jeffrey Wool, ‘Rethinking the Notion of
Uniformity in the Drafting of International Commercial Law: a Preliminary Proposal for
Development of a Policybased Unification Model’ (1997) 2 Uniform Law Review 46, 49 proposing
a policy-based unification mode that ‘leaves important related policy-type decisions with
Contracting States to produce the greatest level of support for a convention.’
12 Article 56 of the Convention states that: ‘No reservations may be made to this Convention but
declarations authorised by Articles 39, 40, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58 and 60 may be made in
accordance with these provisions’ (emphasis added); see also Goode, (n 7) 532.
13 Roy Goode rightfully points out that the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is not
entirely consistent with regards to the unilateral nature of reservations. For more details see ibid,
532, n 48.
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to the legal effect of an international instrument.14 In contrast, the contents of
declarations are usually specifically defined in the international instrument, such
as, for example, in case of the Convention in Articles 39, 40, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57,
58, and 60. This is also true for the date of entry into force or the date of with-
drawal of declarations. For example, the Convention specifies in Article 57(2) that
subsequent declarations shall take effect on the first day of the month following
the expiration of six months after the date of receipt of the notification by the
Depositary. Equally, a withdrawal of a declaration takes effect—according to
Article 58(1)—on the first day of the month following the expiration of six
months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Depositary. Having
clarified the difference between reservations and declaration, the next section
turns to the question: what is the purpose of declarations both in international
private law generally and speficially under the Convention?
3. Purpose of declarations in international law
The primary rationale behind declarations is simple. They provide States with
flexibility in the ratification process in cases where provisions of the international
instrument are in fundamental conflict with a national legal system. They can be
understood as addressing three principal concerns of States. They are the follow-
ing: the protection of national interests, preservation of legal traditions, and
control over public policy concerns. The assumption behind declarations in inter-
national private law is that the framework they create leads to higher ratification
numbers of uniform law instruments.15 The lack of widespread ratification cre-
ates severe problems. It undermines the significance of uniform law instruments16
or, even worse, can mean that they may not enter into force at all since the
requisite number of ratifications has not been achieved.17 As an example of a
well-functioning system of declarations, one only need look to at the Convention
(and the Protocol) because for decades the unification of personal property
securities law has been historically regarded as both undesirable and infeasible,
especially owing to the deeply rooted legal traditions and cultures enshrined in
domestic legal rules.18
4. Purpose of declarations under the Cape Town Convention
If one considers the Convention’s structure of declarations, four different groups
may be identified: opt-in, opt-out, mandatory, and other declarations. By means
14 Torsello, (n 12) 88 et seqq; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Flexibility in International Agreements’ in Jeffrey L
Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and
International Relations (Cambridge University Press 2012).
15 See footnote 12.
16 See, for example, the UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (1988) and the
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring (1988).
17 See, for example, the Convention on Agency in the International Sales of Good (1983) or the
UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (2009).
18 Goode, (n 7) 532: ‘The declarations feature was designed to ensure that States otherwise favouring
the Convention might feel obliged to refuse to ratify it.’
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of opt-in declarations, a Contracting State gives effect to a particular provision.
The declarations under Article 39 (‘[n]on-consensual rights and interests having
priority without registration’), Article 40 (‘[r]egistrable non-consensual rights or
interests’), and Article 60 (‘[a]pplication of Convention priority rules to pre-
existing rights or interests’) fall in this category. Opt-out declarations provide
the possibility of excluding the applicability of a certain provision, as applied by a
Protocol, in that Contracting State. The declarations under Article 54
(‘[d]eclarations regarding remedies’), Article 55 (‘[d]eclarations regarding relief
pending final determination’), and Article 50 (‘[i]nternal transactions’) are of this
kind. Mandatory declarations require States to make this kind of declaration
because without them the Depository will not accept any State’s deposit of a
binding instrument of ratification or accession. The declarations under Article
54(2) for the availability of self-help remedies and Article 48(2) for Regional
Economic Integration Organizations fall in this category. Finally, the last group-
ing of declarations is a catch-all category. Under Article 53 (‘[d]etermination of
courts’), Contracting States may define the relevant court for the purposes of the
Convention. Pursuant to Article 52 (‘[t]erritorial units’), Contracting States can
also declare that the Convention may only extend to certain territorial units of a
Contracting State. It is important to note that the Aircraft Protocol provides for
further declarations, and this is also true for the other protocols relating to railway
rolling stock and space assets.
If one considers the various types of declarations, it is recognizable that pri-
marily opt-out declarations—in particular, Articles 54 and 55 of the
Convention—serve the purpose of flexibility in the ratification process. For ex-
ample, Article 54(2) of the Convention allows Contracting States to decide about
the exercise of non-judicial remedies. Thus, States that prefer a debtor-protective
approach relating to secured transaction law may choose to have a declaration
that disallows private enforcement. Similarly, these States may also declare, under
Article 55, not to apply the provisions of Article 13 (relief pending final deter-
mination) and 43 (jurisdiction under Article 13). A review of the ratification
status of the Cape Town Convention reveals that, on the whole, States with a
basis or roots in civil law have fully declared against the availability of self-help
remedies, especially because non-judicial remedies are generally viewed with
scepticism in these jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, one can question the traditional assumption that the
Convention’s use of declarations is primarily opening doors for States to maintain
their domestic legal culture. It is gradually being recognized that the function of
declarations should be understood more widely and thus, should not be limited to
their compromising function in the ratification process. Indeed, declarations do
have a significant economic impact in the context of the Convention. This is
because State parties and private actors are all able to quickly draw conclusions
about the financial risk and legal situation based on the declarations made by
Contracting States. The transparency arises mainly from two provisions. First,
Article 62(1) of the Convention states that the International Institute for the
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Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is designated as Depositary of the
Convention. Second, UNIDROIT’s role as Depositary is further defined by the
legal duties set forth in Article 62(2). The most important aspect of these various
duties is the depositary’s extensive information obligation, requiring the deposi-
tory to inform all Contracting States of the current status of the Convention and
the declarations made by Contracting States to these instruments. UNIDROIT meets
this obligation by operating an online presence displaying both this and further
information.19 Thus, the point is that these declarations equally allow states to
override national legal peculiarities in a well-defined and limited area of law in
order to achieve economic benefits that are typically not afforded by non-harmo-
nized national rules.
III. The qualifying declarations
1. Introduction
The economic function of declarations under the Convention is evidenced by the
qualifying declarations. They are frequently cited as a critical factor for the cre-
ation of the Convention’s economic benefits. Thus, this section seeks to resolve
the question: what advantages can directly be attributed to the qualifying declar-
ations that are internationally recognized as determinants of a proper implemen-
tation of the Convention into national law? To answer this question, the first
subsection explores the internal legal and economic mechanics of the Cape Town
Discount to better understand how the qualifying declarations really function. It
will be shown that the qualifying declarations operate rather differently from how
they are perceived in academic literature and practice, especially with regards to
the infrequently granted Cape Town Discount.
2. Cape Town Discount
Under the ASU, the Cape Town Discount is a reduction of 10 percent of the
minimum premium rate granted by governmental export credit agencies. The
discount may be applicable for buyers and lessors of aircraft if they are located in a
State that has been determined through OECD procedures to be eligible.20
The participants of the ASU maintain an eligibility list (the Cape Town List) of
Contracting States.21 The criteria agreed upon by participants to the ASU for
19 UNIDROIT, ‘Status of the Cape Town Convention’ <http://www.unidroit.org/status-
2001capetown> accessed 6 April 2019; UNIDROIT, ‘Status of the Aircraft Protocol’ <http://www.
unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft> accessed 6 April 2019.
20 It important to note that the Participants do not constitute an OECD body and that the ASU is not
a formal OECD Act as defined under Article 5 of the OECD Convention. From a purely legal
perspective, Participants to the ASU are not bound by OECD Procedure although they have
voluntarily chosen to follow them.
21 The Participants are: Australia, Canada, the European Community (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Japan, Korea (Republic of), New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland and the USA. See OECD, ‘Summary Overview of the Arrangement’ (2018) <http://
www.oecd.org/trade/xcred/summaryoverviewofthearrangement.htm> accessed 6 April 2019.
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States to be added to the Cape Town List, and, therefore, to benefit from the
reduced premium rate, are detailed in Section II of Appendix II of the ASU.22 In
particular, a State is expected to meet the following three requirements: (i) to be a
Contracting Party to the Cape Town Convention; (ii) to comply with the qual-
ifying declarations; and (iii) to have effectively implemented the Cape Town
Convention (including the qualifying declarations) into national law.23 In this
article, we shall refer to these criteria as (i) ratification; (ii) qualifying declarations;
and (iii) the compliance requirement. The first lesson that one can draw from this
is that there is a direct link between the qualifying declaration and the Cape Town
Discount.
But making the qualifying declaration is not a sufficient condition for the Cape
Town Discount. As of today, the Cape Town List includes only 29 States—namely
Angola, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Fiji, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal,
Singapore, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Vietnam.24 Astonishingly, there are
relatively few Contracting States entitled to the discount, if one considers the
Convention’s high number of ratifications and the fact that the overwhelming
majority of Contracting States have made the ‘qualifying declarations’.25 As a
result, the the Aviation Working Group has asserted that more Contracting
States should be added to this list.26 This leaves one significant question: what
are the reasons for the fairly short Cape Town List? In order to answer that
question, the article now turns to an examination of the application procedure
of the Cape Town Discount.
3. Application procedure of the Cape Town List
The procedure agreed upon by the participants to the ASU for States to be added
to the Cape Town List is detailed in Section II of Appendix II of the ASU. As a first
step, there must be a formal proposal to the ASU Participants from a government
that provides official support for aircraft.
A. Content of Proposal
Article 41 sets out the matters that have to be included in the State’s proposal.
They are: (i) the date of deposit of the instruments with UNIDROIT; (ii) a copy of
22 OECD, ‘Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits – Annex III Sector Understanding
on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft’, (n 1) 75.
23 In particular, under the OECD Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft, a
Contracting State is expected to opt for the declarations set out in Article 2 of Annex I, and refrain
from the declarations listed in Article 3 of this Annex I. Ibid, (n 1) 80 et seq.
24 OECD, ‘Cape Town Convention (CTC) Contracting Parties Qualifying for a CTC Discount’ (30th
August 2018) <http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/ctc.htm> accessed 6 April 2019.
25 UNIDROIT, ‘Status of the Aircraft Protocol’ UNIDROIT, ‘Status of the Cape Town Convention’, (n 19).
26 Aviation Working Group, ‘Cape Town Convention and Export Credit’ (2015) <http://www.awg.
aero/projects/capetownconvention/> accessed 6 April 2019, states that: ‘AWG believes select other
countries should be added to this list and are consulting with relevant parties in that regard’.
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the declarations made by the State; (iii) the date on which the Cape Town
Convention and the qualifying declarations have entered into force; (iv) an im-
plementation analysis of the Convention and its qualifying declaration to ensure
that the Convention’s commitments are appropriately transformed into the do-
mestic legal system; and (v) a duly completed Cape Town Convention question-
naire of a law firm located in the jurisdiction of the relevant State.27 One
exception to this rule is an application for reinstatement of a State that has
been previously removed from the Cape Town List. These types of proposals,
in accordance with Article 44, require the government to include a description of
the circumstances that gave rise to the removal of the State as well as a report of
the subsequent corrective actions in support of reinstatement.28
B. Cape Town discount questionnaire
The Cape Town Convention questionnaire that is attached as Annex II to the ASU
is of considerable importance for the proposal. The questionnaire is structured in
two parts. The first seeks to address the impartiality and experience of the relevant
law firm located in the jurisdiction of the State that is proposed to be added to the
Cape Town List. For example, the former criteria are assessed by the question of
whether the law firm is involved in a transaction that would benefit from the Cape
Town Discount if the proposed State is added to the Cape Town List. The latter is
evaluated by requiring the law firm to describe its previous experience with regard
to the implementation of international treaties in the State in general.
Additionally, the law firm must describe its experience in advising either a gov-
ernment on implementation and enforcement of the Convention or the private
sector or enforcement of creditor’s rights in the State that is proposed to be added
to the Cape Town List.
The second part of the questionnaire concerns questions of substantive law
relating to the qualifying declarations, the ratification process, the effect of na-
tional and local law, and court and administrative decisions. Clearly, the focus is
on the compliance criteria of being added to the Cape Town List, which is the
effective implementation of the Convention and compliance with its standards.
Admittedly, some of these questions appear to be straightforward—for example,
has the State ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the Cape Town
Convention and Aircraft Protocol? Or has the State made each of the qualifying
declarations in accordance with the ASU? However, others seem to be more
complex from a legal point of view and costly in terms of time.
Specifically, in the section entitled ‘Effect of National and Local Law’, the law
firm is asked to provide details as to whether—and if so, how—the framework of
the Convention would have priority over any conflicting national law, regulation,
order, judicial precedent, or regulatory practice. In addition, the law firm is
27 OECD, ‘Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits: Annex III Sector Understanding on
Export Credits for Civil Aircraft’, (n 1) Article 41.
28 Ibid, Article 44.
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requested to list any existing gaps in the implementation of the Convention in the
relevant State. But these questions are not the only ones that seek to evaluate the
legal system of the State under review in terms of the Convention’s effective
implementation. Similar questions are also raised in the section entitled ‘Court
and Administrative Decisions’. Again, the law firm is requested to describe and
specify potential issues in the present or past that might result or have resulted in a
failure of a judicial, regulatory, or administrative body to give full force and effect
to the Convention. If so, the law firm is asked to attach any relevant precedent or
decision in this context.
C. Application for addition to the Cape Town List
Upon submission of a comprehensive proposal, the Secretariat circulates it via
electronic mail within five working days.29 At this point the ASU Participants
decide whether the requirements of the ASU with respect to the Cape Town
Discount provisions have been met. The participants may either agree to, or
challenge, a submitted proposal within 20 working days from the date of submis-
sion of the proposal.30 After expiration of this period, and in case no challenge has
been made to the proposal and it has not been withdrawn, the proposed update to
the Cape Town List is deemed to have been accepted by all participants. As a
result, the OECD Secretariat will add the respective State to the Cape Town List
and send a message via electronic mail within five working days. The updated
Cape Town List will take effect on the date of this message.31
D. Challenge of an application for addition to the Cape Town List
Participants may also decide to challenge the proposal brought forward for the
addition of a State to the Cape Town List within 20 working days from the date of
submission of the proposal. In such a scenario, the challenging participant is
required to provide a written explanation of the grounds for challenge that will
be circulated to all participants by the OECD Secretariat within the initial period
of 20 working days.32 Subsequently, the participants are asked to reach consensus
on the proposal within a further period of 10 working days.33 If an agreement is
reached among the participants, the Cape Town List will be updated in accord-
ance with the procedure just outlined. However, if there is still no agreement, then
it is the chairman’s responsibility to facilitate a consensus within a further 20
working days.34
As a last resort, the chairman is requested under the ASU to make a written
recommendation with respect to the proposed update of the Cape Town List,
29 Ibid, Articles 42 (‘Addition’) and 44 (‘Reinstatement’).
30 Ibid, Article 45.
31 Ibid, Article 46; Interestingly, the latest update to the List was on 30 August 2018.
32 Ibid, Articles 45 and 47.
33 Ibid, Article 47.
34 Ibid, Article 49.
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which participants are asked to accept.35 The procedure explicitly requires the
written recommendation to be based on the majority view emerging from the
positions openly expressed by at least the participants that provide official sup-
port for aircraft exports. In the absence of such majority, the chairman shall make
a recommendation based exclusively on the views expressed by the participants
and shall specify in writing the basis for the recommendation, including in the
case of ineligibility, the discussed criteria that were not met.36 Notably, the rec-
ommendation must not contain any information relating to participants’ views or
positions expressed in the procedure.37
E. Application for removal from the Cape Town List
Furthermore, participants and non-participants that provide official support for
aircraft exports may propose that a State be removed from the Cape Town List.38
Such a proposal must include not only a comprehensive summary of the
grounds—especially the actions or omissions in violations of the State’s commit-
ments under the treaty—but also supporting documents if available. Upon sub-
mission, the OECD Secretariat will circulate the proposal for removal via
electronic mail within five working days.39 Again, the participants may either
agree to or challenge a proposal within a period of 20 working days.40 The chal-
lenge procedure follows the principles just outlined above. If after the expiration
of the period the proposal has not been withdrawn, no evidence of corrective
actions or events has been presented and no challenge has been made to the
proposal, the application for removal is deemed to have been accepted by all
participants.41 The updated Cape Town List will take effect after the OECD
Secretariat has updated the Cape Town List and sent a message to this effect
via electronic mail within five working days.42
4. Limitations of the Cape Town Discount
Given this context, one can draw several explanations for the relatively short Cape
Town List that shall now be discussed. First, it is critical to note that an addition to
the Cape Town List is not an automated process. After formally applying, States
have to sufficiently demonstrate to the participants that they fulfil the aforemen-
tioned ratification, qualifying declarations, and compliance requirements.43
Whereas the former two requirements are easy to determine from a legal per-
spective, the question of whether the Cape Town Convention, including the
35 Ibid, Article 49 (c).
36 Ibid, Article 49 (a).
37 Ibid, Article 49 (b).
38 Ibid, Article 43.
39 Ibid, Article 43.
40 Ibid, Article 45.
41 Ibid, Article 46.
42 Ibid, Article 46.
43 Ibid, Article 39.
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qualifying declarations, has effectively been implemented into national law re-
quires careful legal research and sound judgment as demonstrated by the Cape
Town Convention questionnaire. This is a fairly complex, costly, and time-con-
suming process given the administrative burden of obtaining all the necessary
information and legal opinion. Accordingly, it is not surprising that in practice
States have generally only been proposed for addition to the list in the context of
an impending aircraft export credit transaction in the proposed State.
Second, given this context, one should mention that even though a State has
made the qualifying-declarations failure to implement the Convention properly
into domestic law can be a reason for a State not to be added to the Cape Town
List in the first place as well as for being removed from it subsequently. There is an
explicit procedure for the removal of a State from the Cape Town List if they
violate their Cape Town Convention commitments.44 Therefore, there is a chance
that States might have been removed from the Cape Town List. But this is only
speculation at this point because there is no public data available on the OECD
website with regard to the historical evolution of the Cape Town List.
Third, it is of critical importance to note that the participants do not constitute
an OECD body and that the ASU is not a formal OECD Act (as defined under
Article 5 of the OECD Convention).45 This raises the question: what is the legal
nature of the ASU? The legal nature is crucial to the understanding, interpretation,
and application of the Cape Town Discount. It is generally accepted that the ASU is
neither a binding international treaty nor customary international law. It is merely
a gentleman’s agreement.46 For our purposes, a gentleman’s agreement describes
an agreement that is entered into by States without an intention to create legal
rights or obligations. As a result, there is no way of enforcing its guidelines against
its participants, even if a Contracting States fulfils all requirements.
In conclusion, the key lesson one should draw from the analysis of the Cape
Town List procedure is that making the qualifying declaration is a necessary, but
not a sufficient, condition for being eligible for the Cape Town Discount. The
question then becomes what is added by the qualifying declarations to the legal
and economic analysis of the Convention’s implementation? Is it that the qual-
ifying declarations in question create economic advantages other than the Cape
Town Discount?
5. Risk reduction
In the author’s opinion, the real rationale behind the qualifying declarations
seems to be that they fulfil an important function in minimizing credit risk in
44 Ibid, 81: ‘Any Participant or non-Participant which provides official support for aircraft may
propose to that a State be removed from the Cape Town List if they are of the view that such
State has taken actions that are inconsistent with, or failed to take actions that are required by
virtue of, that State’s Cape Town Convention commitments.’
45 Janet Levit, ‘The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 65.
46 OECD, ‘The Arrangement from the Inside’ in OECD (ed), The Export Credit Arrangement:
Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998 (OECD 1998); Levit, (46) 77.
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a specific transaction setting. In this context, it must be emphasized that, in
aircraft finance, the lengthier the process for a creditor to regain possession of
an aircraft object, the higher the risk of its exposure.47 Indeed, as already men-
tioned, the qualifying declarations are primarily those declarations relating to the
exercise of non-judicial remedies, advance relief, availability of the lease remedy,
IDERA, remedies on insolvency, and insolvency assistance procedures—and can
be understood as addressing one principal concern of creditors: reduction of
repossession time for aircraft and, consequently, risk.48
Notably, the prompt enforcement and the bankruptcy law enforcement prin-
ciple are incorporated in the qualifying declarations.49 This is, first, because
Contracting States must not opt out of advance relief and declare a fairly short
time frame of 10 days for completion of the proceedings in respect of the advance
relief remedies in Article 13(1)(a)–(c) and 30 days for actions specified in Article
13(1)(d)–(e). Further, Contracting States must not opt out of the de-registration
and export request authorization that allows a designated creditor to swiftly seek
deregistration and export of the aircraft without the registry authority having
discretion in this regard. Both of these declarations ensure a prompt realization at
market value of the aircraft assets given as security. Further, by requiring
Contracting States to apply the entirety of Alternative A under Article XI with
a waiting period of no more than 60 calendar days, secured creditors have the
ability to swiftly recover the value of the aircraft equipment further in insolvency
proceedings. The increased creditor confidence resulting from the qualifying dec-
larations has the effect of lowering credit costs.50 Transactions in States with
underdeveloped secured transactions laws will benefit the most from implement-
ing the qualifying declarations, and transactions in States with highly developed
secured transaction laws will benefit the least.51
Interestingly, the treatment of certain declarations taken together as qualifying
recognizes the interrelationship or interdependency of the various remedies of the
47 Ludwig Weber and Artur Eberg, ‘The Cape Town Convention and Its Implementation in Russia
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)’ (2014) 39 Air and Space Law 1, 9; Anthony
Saunders and Ingo Walter, ‘Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment as Applicable to Aircraft Equipment through the Aircraft Equipment Protocol:
Economic Impact Assessment’ (1999) 23 Air & Space Law 339, 354.
48 Vadim Linetsky, ‘Economic Benefits of the Cape Town Treaty’ <http://www.awg.aero/assets/
docs/economicbenefitsofCapeTown.pdf> accessed 6 April 2019, 2: ‘the ratification and effective
implementation of the C.T.T. results in significant risk reduction to lenders in secured aircraft
financing transactions.’ Further, Vadim Linetsky estimates that the total savings directly resulting
from the risk reduction due to reducing the worldwide repossession delay from ten to two months
are on the order of US $161 billion in the period of 2009–30.
49 For a detailed discussion of the principles in the Convention see: Saunders and Walter, (n 47) 10 et
seq.
50 Roy Goode, ‘The preliminary draft Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment:
the next stage’ (1999) 4 Uniform Law Review 265, 266 and 267; Roy Goode, ‘From Acorn to Oak
Tree: the Development of the Cape Town Convention and Protocols’ (2012) 17 Uniform Law
Review 599, 601; Weber and Eberg, (n 47) 9.
51 Anthony Saunders, Anand Srinivasan and Ingo Walter, ‘Innovation in International Law and
Global Finance: Estimating the Financial Impact of the Cape Town Convention’ <http://hdl.
handle.net/2451/26364> accessed 6 April 2019, 9.
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Convention and the Protocol. This only makes sense because the enforcement
system provided by the treaty must work at all stages of proceedings if it is to be
effective. Take, for example, the right to termination of the agreement. It is, itself,
pointless if the creditor is not entitled to obtain possession, control, or custody of
the aircraft and/or de-registration of the object afterwards. Likewise, the right to
repossession would be of no avail for the creditor if the aircraft object cannot be
de-registered in the current jurisdiction and re-registered in another. In the ab-
sence of successful de-registration, the aircraft will just sit with the creditor and
quickly deteriorate without generating any revenue (this being a consequence of
the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation).52 Although the various
remedies under the Convention may be technically independent from each other,
their isolated assessment poses some difficulties. An effective implementation of
the Convention and the qualifying declarations has to consider all of these
circumstances.
IV. Conclusion
There are several lessons that can be drawn from the analysis of the qualifying
declarations for the purpose of implementing the Convention and the Protocol.
The most general observation is that the traditional concept of declaration is out-
dated in the context of the Convention and the Protocol. Declarations do have an
economic effect for Contracting States. The qualifying declarations are a good ex-
ample of this; they embrace a combined legal and economic approach to declar-
ations, as evidenced by the Cape Town Discount and their risk reduction effect.
However, the qualifying declarations operate rather differently from how they
are perceived in academic literature and practice, especially with regard to the
infrequently granted Cape Town Discount. What is sometimes lost is the fact that
the critical advantage of the Convention and the Protocol (together with the
qualifying declaration) is the potential to reduce enforcement risk relating to
different States in a specific transactional setting, and not, as some observers
might wrongly perceive, from the Cape Town Discount. Thus, if States are not
prepared to make the qualifying declarations, this should not deter them from
ratifying the Convention and the Protocol. States and society may benefit from
adoption of the Convention and its related protocols with partial—or even with-
out—the adoption of the qualifying declarations, bearing in mind of course the
interdependency of the Convention’s remedies.53 In this context, further non-
measurable economic benefits, for example, may arise from harmonization of
domestic secured transactions law or the solution of the lex situs problem.54
52 This is because Article 18 of the Chicago Convention states that ‘An aircraft cannot be validly
registered in more than one State, but its registration may be changed from one State to another.’
Consequently, the prohibition on dual registration effectively establishes a link between the right
to re-possession and the right to de-registration.
53 See footnote 11.
54 Saunders and Walter, (n 47) 23: ‘The primary microeconomic impact of the proposed
Convention/Aircraft Protocol is the potential benefits that will accrue by virtue of the reduced
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Consider, in this regard, the following example. An airline’s aircraft, being
financed by a leasing company, are registered in State A and State A has adopted
the qualifying declarations. At some point in the future, there is a chance that the
airline will default, and the leasing company wants to make sure that it can rapidly
repossess the aircraft. But this is exactly the problem: the high mobility of aircraft
objects makes the jurisdiction of enforcement unpredictable at the time of default.
There is a possibility that the location of the aircraft might be in a jurisdiction
where the security interest is not protected or adequately recognized, or even
worse, not recognized at all. Thus, the more States that become parties to the
Convention, the less the location of the aircraft matters. Nevertheless, one has to
note that the Convention does cover both cross-border and purely domestic
transactions and that there may be circumstances in which the vast majority of
the relevant aircraft are used primarily domestically. It should further be men-
tioned that the lex situs problem, to a large extent, has been effectively addressed
by the 1948 Geneva Convention on the Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, which
gives preference to the lex registry for perfecting property rights over aircraft.
It is important to emphasize the benefits of the Convention on a stand-alone
basis. This is because the qualifying declarations require Contracting States to
integrate concepts in their legal systems based on common law. Take again, for
example, the required self-help declaration of Article 54(2). The legal concept of
self-help is frequently found in common law jurisdictions and is typically more
restricted in their civilian counterparts. It follows that common law jurisdictions
may declare for the availability of self-help without any amendments to their legal
systems. On the contrary, civil law jurisdictions may face significant hurdles in
doing so. Additionally, advanced legal systems with a developed commercial case
law, such as France and Germany, may also find it more difficult to make sub-
stantial changes proposed by the qualifying declarations since they face a signifi-
cant risk of disturbing the balance of their highly developed commercial laws.
This would not be a problem at all if one appreciates the public law purpose of
declarations under the Convention to accommodate the different legal views of
civil and common law countries. For example, civil law legal systems might well
opt for Article 13 and Article X as civil law parallels to Article 54(2). More prob-
lematic, however, is that the financial market stigmatizes Contracting States that
are non-compliant with the qualifying declarations. The overemphasis on the
Cape Town Discount in practice and scholarship may have created a deterrence
effect for civil law jurisdictions considering ratifying the Convention if they
cannot comply with the requirements posed by the qualifying declarations. The
cost of financing and the increased availability of credit for the acquisition and use of commercial
aircraft from asset based financing. The general order of magnitude of these benefits . . . appears to
be significant on a stand-alone basis’; Other often non-measurable economic benefits mentioned
in the study are pass-through benefits to passengers and other users of commercial air transport
services, lower transactions costs as a result of harmonization that come in the form of delays,
professional fees, and resale prices of aircraft under distress conditions and improved efficiency in
fleet planning and equipment allocation. See also Saunders, Srinivasan and Walter, (n 51).
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point is that the compromising and balancing function of declarations in terms of
remedies should not be carelessly sacrificed to the belief that meeting the require-
ments of the qualifying declaration is the be-all and end-all prerequisite for bene-
fits of the Convention, especially the Cape Town Discount. Indeed, the primary
function of declarations should remain, to provide States with the ability to ratify
the Convention while maintaining national legal sensitivities in civil and common
law systems.
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